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The 1911 sliding failure of Austin Dam in Potter County, Pennsylvania presents an interesting case history combining an engineering 
failure with ethical, social legal and regulatory issues.  The concrete gravity dam, completed in December 1909, was plagued by poor 
design and construction, influenced greatly by the owner pressuring the designer to keep costs low.  Seepage through the foundation, 
an inadequate shear key, and cracking of the cyclopean concrete, all contributed to the eventual catastrophic failure that destroyed the 
towns of Austin and Costello, claiming at least 78 lives. As a case history, the failure of Austin Dam has applicability to a number of 
ABET program outcomes.   The obvious sliding failure of the dam due to uplift pressures and weakened foundation rock directly 
addresses certain technical program outcomes.  The economic aspects of the dam’s design and construction, the social issues involving 
relief efforts, the contemporary national media coverage, as well as the ethical and legal aspects of the dam’s failure address other 
program outcomes.  Various aspect of the failure of Austin Dam have been documented in several recent papers, providing a 





The sliding failure of a concrete gravity dam just north of the 
town of Austin, Pennsylvania on September 30, 1911, as 
shown in Figure 1, presents a strikingly visual case history for 
undergraduate students of civil engineering.  Located on 
Freeman Run, the town was home to the Bayless Paper Mill. 
Established in 1900 by George C. Bayless of Binhampton, 
NY, the company had constructed a small dam further 
upstream on Freeman Run.  By 1909, the existing reservoir 
was deemed inadequate and the company constructed a new 
concrete gravity dam.  The new dam was 540 feet long and 45 
ft high.  During filling of the reservoir in 1910, the dam 
experienced noticeable movement downstream.  The reservoir 
was temporarily drained and the spillway was enlarged.  The 
reservoir was again filled and on September 30, 1911 the dam 
failed suddenly as the concrete dam slid downstream on its 
foundation and broke apart into large concrete masses.  The 
flood waters destroyed the towns of Austin (pop. 3,200) and 





The Austin Dam failure occurred in north central 
Pennsylvania, about 25 miles south of the NY boarder, as 
shown in Figure 2.  Located near the headwaters of the 
Allegheny, Genesee, and Susquehanna Rivers, Freeman Run 
flows from the north through Austin and then the south and 
east reaching the west branch of the Susquehanna via the 
Sinnamahoning River (Martt et al 2005).   
 
 
Figure 1.  The strikingly visual remnants of Austin Dam as of 
2007. (Andrew T. Rose). 
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Figure 2.  Location of Austin Dam in north-central 
Pennsylvania. (modified from apples4theteacher.com) 
 
The early industries of Austin focused on lumbering in the 
nearby hills.  As the hardwood resources were depleted, the 
industries evolved into producing pulp for paper making use 
of the waste and new growth in the Bayless paper mill [Rich 
2006].  The water-intensive process required a steady water 
supply.  When the first dam constructed proved inadequate 
during drier summer months, Bayless hired engineer T. 
Chalkley Hatton of Wilmington, Delaware in early 1909 to 
design a new dam across Freeman Run.   The new 540 ft long, 
45 ft high concrete dam was completed in December 1909, as 
shown in Figure 3.   
 
 
Figure 3. Photograph of Austin Dam near end of construction, 
prior to filling. (Austin Dam Memorial Association) 
 
 
ASPECTS OF CASE HISTORY  
 
The Austin Dam failure case history presents several aspects 
that can be researched by students or used in class discussion.  
The amount of literature on this case history, both recent 
investigations and discussions, as well as contemporary 
articles and newspaper accounts of the failure, make this case 
easily adaptable for inclusion in the curriculum.  Most of the 
recent papers offer an overview of the failure, while delving 
into various aspect of the case in more detail.   A brief 
summary of several of the topics that can be addressed by this 
case history and the articles that students can use to learn more 
are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Summary of Austin Dam case history topics and 
reference reading 
 
Topic Selected Reference Reading
1
 





Design and Construction  Rich [2006] 
Engineering News [1911] 
Geotechnical Analysis of 
Failure 
Martt et al. [2005] 
USBR [1998] 
Designing Dams for Uplift Jackson [2003] 
Harrison [1912] 
Geology of site Martt et al. [2005] 
Greene [1997] 
Greene and Christ [1998] 
Quality of Concrete Delatte [2009] 
Martt et al. [2005] 
Social Responsibility Rich [2006] 
Taylor [1911] 
Ethical Responsibility Hatton [1912] 
Rich [2006] 
Vesiland [2010] 





Legislation and Regulation Scientific American [1911] 
Rich [2006] 
Water Supply Commission of 
Pennsylvania [1913] 
Contemporary Accounts Largey [2011] 
Engineering News [1911] 
1
 For complete reference, see REFERENCES at end of paper 
 
 
INCORPORATION OF CASE IN TEACHING 
 
The Austin Dam failure can be incorporated into an 
introductory undergraduate geotechnical engineering course.  
One possibility when working in a small class, or perhaps in a 
small laboratory class setting, would be to have three or four 
student teams research various aspects of the failure and its 
consequences and prepare presentations for the class or 
laboratory section.  Another possibility is to have students 
read reference papers addressing one or two aspects of the 
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would be expected to contribute and participate in the 
discussion based on the knowledge gained from their assigned 
reference.  Another possibility is for the instructor to prepare 
and present a comprehensive overview of the case to the class, 
addressing the various aspect of the failure.   
 
Whichever method is used to incorporate the Austin Dam 
failure, a number of notable aspects should be identified and 
discussed.  The sections that follow, present concise 
summaries of these aspects with appropriate references. 
 
 
FLAWS IN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
 
According to Engineering News [1911], dam construction 
began in May 1909 and was completed about December 1, 
1909. The contractor was C.J. Britnall & Co. of Binghamton, 
NY.  The construction involved 7,925 cu. yds. of foundation 
excavation, 6,360 cu. yds. of embankment, and 15,780 cu. yds. 
of concrete.  The total cost was $71,821.48, not including 
engineering.  Figure 4 shows the dam under construction. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Construction of Austin Dam (Courtesy of Potter 
County Historical Society) 
 
Rich [2006] identified several flaws in the dam’s design and 
construction, largely by researching the correspondence 
between the owner, George C. Bayless, and T. Chalkley 
Hatton the Engineer.  In reviewing the correspondence, Rich 
[2006] saw repeated instances of the owner trying to cut costs 
to such an extent that the failure of the dam was inevitable.  
While Hatton stressed in his correspondence with Bayless his 
desire to design a dam that was safe, he also gave in to 
Bayless on several requests to reduce costs.  These 
compromises combined with poor construction and bad 
foundation conditions ultimately resulted in the failure.  in 
multiple situations.  In his design Hatton called for a cut-off 
wall sufficiently deep into the underlying rock, anticipated to 
be 11 feet.  Bayless pushed Hatton to reduce the depth of the 
cut-off wall so that the final depth was only 4 ft into the 
underlying rock.  Another design aspect called for a gate 
house with appropriate vales for cleaning the filter screens and 
fo providing the water supply to the mill.  To reduce costs 
further, Bayless asked for the gate house and valves to be 
eliminated and instead a single pipe through the dam serve 
both purposes.  With some hesitation, Hatton apparently 
relented and agreed to the change but requested a Y at the 
lower end splitting the pipe and providing two vales as a way 
to drain the reservoir, if needed.  Bayless responded that he 
did not see the need for the valve on the outlet pipe and 
instead indicated it would just be capped for the present time 
and that would be sufficient.  
 
Further along in the construction, Rich [2006] documents 
another series of correspondence where Hatton discovers that 
Bayless has directed the construction crew to raise the height 
of the dam and spillway by 2 ft, without consulting Hatton.  
Hatton protests and provided a sketch indicating that the 
stability of the structure will be affected and that changes such 
as this cannot be made without consulting him.  Bayless 
countered that Hatton’s assistant onsite was made aware of the 
changes.   
 
According to Delatte [2009] the dam was constructed of 
cyclopean concrete, with large rock inclusions in the matrix.  
In addition, some of the work was performed under cold 
weather conditions with concrete being placed under freezing 
conditions.  Horizontal and vertical construction joints were 
present in the structure and it is not certain of the efforts taken 
to keep these joints from forming planes of weakness seepage 
paths.within the structure.  Although a minimal amount of 
twisted rods were used to anchor the dam to rock and in the 
thinner upper portion of the dam near the crest, no record 
exists of rods being used across cold joints in the concrete 
structure.  Figure 5 shows the cyclopean nature of the concrete 
in a remnant of the dam.  Figure 6 shows a portion of the dam 
after years of weathering with vertical and horizontal joints 
apparent.  Figure 7 shows one of the rods used to anchor the 
dam to the underlying rock.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Dam remains showing cyclopean concrete. (Andrew 
T. Rose) 
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Figure 6.  Spillway section of dam showing vertical and 
horizontal joints after years of weathering. (Andrew T. Rose) 
 
 
Figure 7.  Rod used in construction of dam. (Andrew T. Rose) 
 
 
WARNING OF PROBLEMS 
 
After the dam was completed and put into service, a problem 
occurred which should have foretold of potential failure.  
After snowmelt and heavy rains in January 1910, the dam was 
subject to a full reservoir and a portion of the dam east of the 
spillway slid downstream about 31 inches at the crest [Greene 
1997], as shown in Figure 8.  The movement was 
accompanied by the observation of vertical cracks on the 
downstream face, seepage in the channel 10 to 12 ft below the 
toe [Engineering News 1911].  The photograph shown in 
Figure 9 indicates that with water going over the spillway, the 
newly completed dam had seepage at several locations on the 
downstream face, possibly originating from construction joints 
in the concrete structure. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Buldgeing of dam crest east of spillway observed in 
January 2010 (Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Seepage on downstream face of dam in January 
2010 (Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society). 
 
This initial movement of the dam by sliding caused concern 
and the effort to relieve pressure behind the dam was 
hampered by the lack of a relief valve, which had been 
eliminated from the design by Hatton, as directed by Bayless 
to save money.  In additon, the cap on the  outlet pipe was at 
the foot of the spillway and inaccessible due to the heavy 
flow, thus removing the cap was not possible [Engineering 
News 1911].  Instead the Bayless company undertook a 
somewhat foolish measure and using dynamite, blasted out a 
small section of the crest about 6 to 8 ft wide and 4 ft below 
the crest.  This lowered the head of water behind the dam to 
about 37 ft, as shown in Figure 10.  Even with the lowering of 
the water level, concern remained, so a second charge was 
used to blow off the cap on the outlet pipe and the reservoir 
was drained [Engineering News 1911].  At that time it was 
observed that part of the embankment on the upstream face 
had eroded away through the outlet pipe and possibly under 
the dam.  It was further observed that a section of the dam had 
moved downstream relative to the inlet chamber wall through 
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which the outlet pipe passed [Engineering News 1911].   
 
 
Figure 10.  Concrete removed by dynamite to relieve pressure 
behind dam, January 1910 (Austin Dam Memorial 
Association). 
 
Comparing Figures 8 and 10, the hole blasted in the crest was 
locanted near the point where the sliding of the dam appeared 
greatest.  No indication is provided at to whether the opening 
of the hole in the dam crest followed by water pouring through 
the new opening lead to erosion at the toe in this region where 
the stability of the dam appears to be worst. 
 
After the movement of the dam in January 1910, dam engineer 
Hatton was contacted and reviewed the situatuation.  Hatton 
felt the need to call on E. Wegmann, a consulting engineer 
based in New York City to assess the situation.  Wegmann 
proposed adding a rockfill buttress on the downstream face to 
increase the stability of the structure, as shown in Figure 11.  
Hatton passed Wegmann’s recommendations onto Bayless, 
but the recommendations were not adopted.  The hole blased 
in the dam crest was patched and within a month of the partial 
failure, Bayless had the reservoir filled to within 2 ft of the 
spillway.  Even with a loss of about 600 gallons per minute of 
seepage visual at the toe of the dam, there seemed to be no 
further concern [Engineering News 1911] 
. 
 
Figure 11.  E. Wegmann’s Feb. 14, 1910 proposal for 
strengthening Dam [Engineering News 1911] 
FINAL FAILURE ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1911 
The dam appears to have functioned adequately until the final 
and complete failure on September 30, 1911.  The dam 
essentially broke into pieces as the water pressure from the 
reservoir behind the dam pushed the massive concrete blocks 
downstream.  Figure 12 shows a view of the dam blocks 
strewn across the valley.  A somewhat fortunate occurance 
was that a nearby resident saw the dam as it burst and 
telephoned dowstream to the town of Austin, giving some 
time to escape the flood waters.  Records indicate at least 78 
people died as a result of the flood.  Most of the casulties were 
in Austin which was about 1 ½ miles below the dam, but there 
were also casulties further downstream in the smaller 
community of Costello.  Figure 13 shows some of the 
destruction caused by the flood. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Austin Dam afther the failure of September 30, 
1911 (Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society). 
 
 
Figure 13.  Main St., Austin, PA, after the flood (Courtesy of 
Potter County Historical Society). 
 
 Paper No. 1.11b              6 
 





















As the dam failed, it essentially broke apart into massive 
pieces that slid downstream.  Figure 14 shows a plan view of 
the dam after the failure.  As can be seen, the portion of the 
dam east of the spillway where the initial movement in 
January 1910 occurred, appears to have been where the dam 
broke apart and the force of the escaping water moved the dam 
greatest [Mckibben 1912].   
 
 
ANALYSIS OF FAILURE 
 
The failure of the dam has been discussed and analyzed to a 
great extent.  At the time of the failure, articles in Engineering 
News [1911], the local and national newspapers, and 
professional society publications [McKibben 1912] analyzed 
and discussed the failure of Austin dam.  The overwhelming 
consensus was that the dam slid on its foundation.  In some 
discussions the concept that water seeping beneath the dam 
softened the rock strata leading to sliding.  Others proposed 
the effect of uplift water pressure on the base of the dam was 
the real contributor to the failure.  The analyses and discussion 
was a useful attempt to clarify the cause of the failure and 
learn from this incident.  Even Hatton [1912] provided his 
opinion and essentially blamed himself for not considering 
how the proposed reservoir full of water would affect the rock 
strata below the dam he was designing.  He states that his big 
mistake was assuming the rock foundation would be 
impervious.   
 
Jackson [2003] considered the state of dam design at the time 
of the Austin disaster.  He notes that there had been prior 
recognition of the role of uplift pressures on dam stability.  By 
the 1890’s European engineers were beginning to consider 
uplift pressures in their designs in both England and France, 
while in the United States, uplift was still not being 
considered.  The sliding failure of Austin Dam in 1911 and 
California’s St. Francis dam in 1928 brought the uplift 
discussion to the forefront in US dam design [Jackson 2003, 
Harrison 1912].  This example of how new knowledge related 
to design concepts may be slowly adopted and influenced by 
engineering failures is a good example of the importance of 
continual professional development for practicing engineers.  
Hatton [1912] adds that he should have consulted an engineer 
more experienced in dam design, especially as they relate to 
dam foundations for this project.   
 
More recent papers have revisited the failure [USBR 1998, 
Greene 1997, Greene and Christ 1998, Martt et al 2005].  
USBR [1998] performed an analysis of the dam cross-section 
for both sliding and overturning stability, as shown in Figure 
15, indicating safety factors of 032 and 1.03, respectively.   
 
Martt et al [2005] performed a more detailed analysis of the 
failure.  Their research included describing the regional 
geology of the site, performing test pits adjacent to some of 
the dam remnants and performing laboratory classification and 
strength tests for the various rock strata present at the site.  
They looked at shear strength and sliding between various 
interfaces in the geologic strata.  From the analysis of their 
dam cross-section, shown in Figure 16, they determined that 
the sliding failure of the dam occurred at the interface between 
the sandstone layer immediately below the dam and the 
underlying shale layer.   
 
Delatte [2009] discusses some other aspects that likely 
contributed to the failure.  Addressing the issues of materials 
and construction, he cites the use of cyclopean concrete in the  
dam, the construction of the concrete during freezing 
temperatures leading to contraction in the dam, and the 
presence of cold joints in the dam as helping contribute to the 
dam’s overall weakness.   
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Figure 15.  USBR [1998] Analysis of Austin Dam Stability. 
 
 
Figure 16.  Cross-Section of Austin Dam used by Martt et al 
[2005] for stability analyses. 
 
 
RELIEF EFFORTS AND SOCIAL RESPONSABILITY 
 
The relief efforts and stories of the suffering and triumph of 
the human spirit resulting from the Austin Dam failure have 
also been documented.  Nuschke [1988], Largey [1997, 2011] 
and Dixon [1912] present overviews of how the community, 
region, state and nation responded to the tragedy.  Figure 17 
shows how tents provided necessary facilities, such as a 
morgue.  Other articles question the cause of the failure, 
especially related to the greed of the owners in light of the 
progressive movement in the early 20
th
 century [Taylor 1911].  
Rich [2006] has revisited the social responsibility aspects of 
the failure.  He took an expanded to look at the responsibility 
of a number of various parties including the owner, the 
engineer, the townspeople, the commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, and professional societies of the time.  It is 
noted to by the Austin Dam Memorial Association that the 
town of Austin provided an attractive incentive package to 
Bayless to build his mill in Austin.  The people of Austin and 
their leaders were quite dependent on the Bayless mill for their 
livelihood and were reluctant to show any concern for the dam 
that brought economic life to the town.     
 
 
AFTERMATH OF THE FAILURE  
 
Shortly after the failure, calls for state regulation of dams were 
made [Scientific American 1911].  While some states had 
already enacted regulations for dams, many were not 
necessarily strict and often were applicable to publicly owned 
dams and not those built and operated by industry.  Within 
Pennsylvania, legislation was enacted by 1913 to provide state 
oversight for dams [Rich 2006].   
 
Jackson [2003], Rich [2006], and Vesilind [2010] discusss the 
ethical issues of the failure.  While there is no record of Hatton 
ever being reprimanded or found legally resoponsible for the 
failure, Vesilind [2010] notes he would have been in today’s 
professional societies.  He adds that Hatton’s career 
blossomed after the Austin Dam failure.  He was active in 
professional environmental societies and served as chief 
engineer for the Milwalkee, WS sanitary authority. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Morgue housed in tent during the relief effort 
(Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society). 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
The failure of Austin Dam on September 30, 1911 provides an 
interesting case history for undergraduate students of civil 
engineering.  The mistakes of the various parties involved are 
easily understood.  The analysis of the dam for both sliding 
and overturning is easily incorporated and discussed by entry 
level students and provides exposure to a number of technical 
as well as non-technical issues that are an integral part of the 
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